Is There a Market for Voluntary Health Insurance in Developing Countries? by Mark Pauly et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES











¸ The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2008 by Mark Pauly, Fredric E. Blavin, and Sudha Meghan. All rights reserved. Short sections of
text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit,
including © notice, is given to the source.Is There a Market for Voluntary Health Insurance in Developing Countries?
Mark Pauly, Fredric E. Blavin, and Sudha Meghan




In many developing countries the proportion of health care spending paid out of pocket is about half
of all spending or more.  This study examines the distribution of such spending by income and care
type, and the variation in spending about its expected value, in order to see whether voluntary private
health insurance that reduces variation in spending might be able to be supplied.  Using data from
the World Health Survey for 14 developing countries, we find that out of pocket spending varies by
income but that most spending usually occurs in income quintiles below the topmost quintile. We
use estimates of the variance of total spending, hospital spending, physician spending, and outpatient
drug spending about their means to generate estimates of the risk premia risk averse consumers might
pay for insurance coverage.  For hospital spending and total spending, these risk premia as a percent
of expenses are generally larger than reasonable estimates of private health insurer loading as a percent
of expenses, suggesting that voluntary insurance might be feasible.  However, the strong relationship
between spending and income suggests that insurance markets may need to be segmented by income.
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  In almost all developing countries a sizeable proportion of total national health care 
expenditures are paid out of pocket.  We have noted elsewhere that there are potential 
utility gains from making insurance available in such countries to risk averse consumers 
who might otherwise need to make large out of pocket payments (Pauly and Zweifel, 
2006).  The private gain to citizens from protecting themselves from a rare but very high 
medical expense might motivate voluntary insurance purchase if that insurance can be 
offered at attractive premiums.  There might also be a widespread societal gain if some of 
those who can now obtain insurance were households whose poor health outcomes and 
catastrophic ruin from high medical bills are of highest concern.   
  This study looks at the potential for voluntary health insurance in a sample of truly 
“developing” countries, ones with low but growing per capita incomes. It looks at the 
potential demand for an all-inclusive insurance, for one that covers hospital care, and for 
one that covers outpatient drugs only.  We show that potential demand for voluntary 
health insurance is not concentrated in the highest strata of the income distribution, but 
often extends to lower income levels as well.  The demand for insurance exists for two 
reasons: first, for many households the possibility of a high out of pocket payment, 
though low, is real: there is a risk to be confronted.  Second, the variance of potential out 
of pocket spending is quite large, so that (with plausible assumptions about risk 
aversion), the “risk premium” people would be willing to pay above the expected value 
of the benefits is fairly large, which in turn implies that an insurance plan should 
profitably be able to charge premiums that cover both its expected benefits costs and its 
administrative expenses, for plausible values of those administrative expenses. 2 
 
  This is so even for people not at the highest income levels. (We will usually define as 
“high income” those in the highest quintile of the distribution of household income).  In 
almost all of the countries we examine, people with estimated incomes below the topmost 
quintile account for most of the out of pocket payments made.  However, the mean or 
expected out of pocket expense varies with income.  We will show that this implies 
segmenting the voluntary insurance market so that those with lower incomes are able to 
pay premiums based on their below-average spending;  compared to charging premiums 
based on average expense across all income groups, a segmented policy will not cross-
subsidize the rich and will be more attractive to lower income consumers.  
  Finally, we examine the likelihood a voluntary market might be feasible by 
estimating the amount of people in each developing country would be willing to pay for 
insurance above the expected value of benefits and comparing this “risk premium” (as 
part of the total premium) with likely values for the administrative expense share of 
insurance premiums.  In particular, we use the variance of out of pocket spending 
combined with accepted risk aversion parameters to estimate the “risk premium.” In most 
(though not all) the countries we study, this risk premium (expressed as percentage of 
expected benefits for full coverage insurance) is in the neighborhood of the kinds of 
administrative expense percentages that insurers in private markets can generate.  This is 
especially so for insurance that would pay for hospital care; it is also true for 
comprehensive insurance that covered hospital, physician, and drug expenses. 
  However, the risk premium for stand alone drug insurance is relatively low, while at 
the same time drug spending constitutes a large share of total out of pocket spending.  
These findings suggest that a comprehensive insurance (rather than a hospitalization-only 3 
 




  The theory of insurance demand predicts that risk averse households will voluntarily 
purchase insurance if it can be offered to them at a premium whose excess over expected 
expenses is smaller than the “risk premium” they would be willing to pay.  That risk 
premium in turn depends on the variance of the losses the insurance will cover and on the 
household’s extent of risk aversion (Phelps, 2003, p. 323).  There will be little demand 
for insurance if the variance of the losses is small or the administrative “loading” in 
excess of the fair premium is high.  The value of risk aversion and the loading that would 
be charged in insurance markets should they come into existence is obviously not known 
precisely at present.  But by computing a risk premium based on actual variance of 
expenses and plausible values for the risk aversion coefficient, we can estimate the 
maximum value of the loading at which a market can exist.  If this maximum acceptable 
loading is higher than plausible conjectures about insurer administrative costs (and 
normal profit) for a market in voluntary insurance without subsidies, we will conclude 
that even an unsubsidized voluntary market appears possible. By extension, modest 
subsidies can substantially improve the functioning of voluntary private insurance 
markets. 
  The implication is that a voluntary health insurance market is most likely to emerge 
when three conditions hold: (1) there is a risk of out of pocket payments which are high 
relative to households’ income or wealth; (2) insurance firms can offer premiums to 4 
 
different households that are close to the different households’ expected value of out of 
pocket medical spending; and (3) loadings for administrative costs and profits are 
moderate.  Of course, some of these quantitative terms, like “close” and “moderate,” 
remain to be determined. 
 
The sample of countries. 
  We selected a sample of convenience of fourteen developing countries with 
moderately large populations, per capita incomes that are low compared to developed 
countries but above subsistence levels, and generally high values for real economic 
growth.  Table 1 shows these countries, their per capita incomes and income growth 
rates, and the proportion of medical spending made out of pocket.  We intentionally 
chose the sample to include countries from Africa, East Asia, and the former Soviet 
Union.  Though the sample is obviously not random, it should illustrate whether the key 
parameters of insurance demand tend to vary across countries, and offer some evidence 
on the generalizeability of conclusions (recognizing that there are rarely enough 
observations of different countries in cross-country studies to support a guarantee that 
something will probably work everywhere).  The most notable finding in Table 1 is the 
high percentage of out of pocket payment at the point of use (for example, in the US the 
comparable figure would be about 12%).  In most of these countries the proportion of 
people with formal insurance is low, but high out of pocket proportions even occur in 
countries like Kazakhstan and Georgia where the proportion of the population nominally 
with health insurance is large. 
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The World Health Survey. 
  We primarily rely on data from the 2002 World Health Survey (WHS) which was 
implemented in 71 countries by the World Health Organization.  The WHS contains 
individual and household-level data on the health of populations and outcomes associated 
with health systems (World Health Organization, 2003).  Approximately 4,000 to 6,000 
households are surveyed in each country using a multistage stratified random cluster 
sample.  The most knowledgeable household member (household informant) answers the 
household survey.  Our final household-level dataset combines information on household 
survey, which includes health expenditures, permanent income measures, and insurance 
status, with demographic information on the household informant from the individual 
survey.  The survey does not gather data on individual health expenses.   
 
Definition of income. 
  Measures of annual money income were not obtained in the World Health Survey. It 
is likely that any measures would have been imprecise, because of imperfect recall and 
the importance of income in kind (e.g., consuming home agricultural production).  We 
wish only to divide households in each country into income quintiles; great precision in 
the income measure is not required for this task.  We show average out of pocket medical 
expense per household by income stratum with the strata based on two measures: (1) a 
“permanent income” measure suggested by the WHO based on a regression of 
consumption spending on some indicators of wealth, such as whether the household owns 
a bicycle, etc. (Ferguson et al. 2003); (2) Because this measure is likely to be unbiased 
but contain substantial measurement error, we also developed an alternative measure 6 
 
based on actual consumption spending less actual medical care spending for each 
household,  plus an estimate of expected medical expenses based the WHO permanent 
income regression variables.   
 
Measuring out of pocket expenses. 
  The World Health Survey asks for household medical expenses, in total and 
separately for inpatient care, drugs, and outpatient physician care, in the month prior to 
the survey.  It only asks for an annual estimate for inpatient hospital expenditures and use 
(as well as monthly hospitalization expenditures), presumably because the larger size and 
rarer frequency of typical inpatient hospital use makes recall less of a problem and 
monthly measures much more noisy.  As we discuss in more detail below, empirical 
measures of risk aversion in the literature are almost all based on annual or lifetime 
income and wealth; fluctuations and mismatches of spending and income over short time 
periods in a year are assumed to be of little or no consequence (but see below on the 
possible “time smoothing” benefits of insurance). 
  This data will allow estimates of annual risk premia for inpatient care based on data 
on the variance in annual out-of-pocket spending relative to its mean, by income stratum.  
It is less than clear how the distribution of annual total medical spending across 
households (or, for that matter, the distribution of lifetime spending) should be related to 
the monthly numbers for the other two categories of spending.  Here the best that we can 
do is to estimate bounds on annual spending and the variance or standard deviation of 
annual spending.  At one extreme, we could assume that almost all illness is chronic, and 
so generate an estimate of annual spending for each household by multiplying its monthly 7 
 
spending by twelve.  (The annual frequency of positive spending in this model would 
then be the same as the monthly frequency.)  The standard deviation of spending relative 
to the mean in this model would be identical at monthly and annual observation periods. 
This would be interpreted as the risk faced by a person contemplating the possibility of a 
future chronic condition which would last at least a year if it occurs, and which occurs at 
the observed frequency of positive spending in the monthly data. 
  At the other extreme, we could assume that all illnesses are acute and independent, 
and are short enough that they almost all begin and end within a month.  Then we could 
estimate annual lifetime expenses for each household based on that assumption that 
monthly spending levels were independently and randomly distributed. Here the average 
annual spending level would still be twelve times the monthly level, but the standard 
deviation of annual spending would in this case be close to the monthly standard 
deviation, and the coefficient of variation would be approximately the monthly standard 
deviation divided by the annual mean spending, a much smaller number than in the 
chronic case. 
  In-between cases which we will simulate will assume that the typical length of an 
episode of spending is greater than a month but less than a year.  We will provide 
estimates of the risk premium based on the assumptions that on average spending 
episodes are three months or six months in duration.   
  The survey did contain a question asking whether any family member had a chronic 
illness or condition which required help from others with activities of daily living.  This 
measures the prevalence of chronic illnesses that lead to frailty, a subset of all chronic 
illnesses.  Only about 6% answered affirmatively.  We have deleted from our sample of 8 
 
potential insurance purchasers this six percent of households who already have strong 
evidence of being high risk at insurance purchase, since the premium they would need to 
be charged in a private market would be high; up to a point they would have a greater 
willingness to pay for a given nominal policy than lower risk households, but high premia 
may run into a budget constraint on insurance.
1  We might imagine that any voluntary 
insurance system would have a subsidized high risk pool to deal with such matters. 
 
Variation in out of pocket spending with income. 
  We first want to determine how out of pocket medical expenses were distributed 
across income strata in these countries.  Table 2 provides the main results, displayed for 
both measures of income.  In most countries the uppermost quintile spends considerably 
less than half of total out of pocket expenses, although there are a few countries (Laos, 
Senegal) where expenses are much more concentrated among the rich.  The distribution 
of expenses by income does seem to vary across these countries, but in all of them there 
is enough spending among people with incomes below the top quintile to suggest that a 
market for insurance could benefit more than just the rich.  
  The distribution by income is somewhat more skewed using the consumption 
definition of income than using the WHO wealth-related distribution.  This is to be 
expected, and reflects a tradeoff between a wealth based measure that is probably more 
influenced by permanent income and a consumption measure that will be affected by 
fluctuations over time.  We do not think it is possible to establish a preference a priori, 
especially if imperfect capital markets mean that consumption cannot easily be smoothed 
                                                 
1 For all countries, except for Georgia and Kazakhstan, we also deleted units where the household 
informant reports having health insurance.  Nearly all households in Georgia and Kazakhstan report having 
health insurance and are included in the final sample.   9 
 
over time. The qualitative pattern of out of pocket spending being related to income, and 
being common in income strata below the topmost, is displayed using either income 
measure. 
  The spending data show, in Table 3, that at every income level drug spending has the 
largest single share of total spending.  Probably hospital and doctor care, largely 
produced with local labor, have a much lower relative price than do pharmaceuticals 
where the local price is closer to the world price, and can often be obtained for low or 
zero cost in whatever public health or safety net system the country offers.   
  Even more relevant to insurance markets, we note in Table 3 that there is substantial 
variation across income strata in the level of expected expenses, with average expenses 
falling in absolute value (though not as a proportion of income) as income falls.  This 
means that insurance that charged the same premium for a given level of coverage to 
consumers at all income levels may have problems of adverse selection by upper income 
people; they would be eager to buy insurance whose premium did not reflect their higher 
demand. Lower income people might decline insurance not just because they are lower 
income or cannot” afford” the premium but also because the premium is high relative to 
what they would expect to receive as benefits.  A market with uniform premiums may 
therefore be limited or, in the extreme, even fail to exist.  Varying the premium (and 
potentially the generosity of coverage) positively with income may permit markets for 
lower income households to survive; segmented markets may have value.  Compared to 
no insurance, which is undesirable, and generous coverage for all, which is infeasible, 
making a lower cost basic insurance available to lower income households may make 
economic sense. 10 
 
 
Variance of hospital spending and theoretical risk premium. 
  Insurance is useful and is demanded voluntarily only when there is variation in actual 
medical expenses about their predicted or expected (average) value; there is no point in 
paying for insurance to cover a sure thing, even a valuable sure thing.  The greater the 
variance in spending for a given expected value, the higher the risk premium (in excess of 
the actuarially fair premium) a risk averse household will be willing to pay.  To illustrate 
the method of estimating risk premia, consider the data on annual hospitalization 
expenses. We first regressed hospital spending within consumption-based income strata 
on household characteristics such as income and family size.  We then calculate the 
variance of actual spending from its regression predicted expected value.  The means and 
coefficients of variation are shown in the first two columns in Table 4.  
  According to Phelps (2003, p. 323), the risk premium is approximately .5*[r(I)/I]*σ
2, 
where r(I) is the relative risk-aversion coefficient, I is income, and σ
2 is the variance of 
the residual for the  risky distribution.  Using a constant risk aversion coefficient of 2.0, 
we find as shown in the third column of Table 4 that the risk premium for hospitalization 
insurance is generally in the range of 40 to 60 percent of its expected value.  (Garber and 
Phelps [1997] indicate that a risk aversion coefficent of 2.0 represents the central 
tendency of estimates in this area.)  As we will discuss in more detail below, it seems 
likely that insurance could be profitably offered at premiums with loadings smaller than 
this proportion. 
 
Total spending, other categories of spending, and risk premia. 11 
 
  As noted above, we do not have annual spending data for the other components of 
medical spending or for total spending.  To approximate measures of spending and risk 
premia on an annual basis, as discussed above we simulate spending based on the 
assumption that the average spell of spending is three or six months in duration. We show 
the national average coefficients of variation (from regression-predicted spending) for 
total spending, physician spending, and drug spending only implied by the assumption 
that spells of spending average both three months and six months in Table 5.  Note that 
the total expenditure figure includes any temporal correlation across the expenditure 
types.  (The expense prediction model was estimated separately for each income stratum.) 
  The table shows that, for total spending, in most countries, the implied risk premia are 
quite high relative to mean expenses.  The risk premia are lower for drug only coverage, 
as might be expected, but even these values may sometimes be attainable by state of the 
art insurance firms.  (As one might expect, the overall risk premia tend to be smaller in 
countries like Kazakhstan where the drug share is high.)  The results indicate that 
bundling drug and physician coverage with other coverage yields a higher proportional 
risk premium than for stand-alone drug insurance.  If insurers could be required to offer 
only comprehensive insurance (rather than permitting drug expenditure to be carved out), 
the emergence of an otherwise voluntary insurance market that covers drug spending 
becomes more likely. 
 
Which income and which spending matters? 
  The theory of the demand for insurance makes the risk premium a buyer would be 
willing to pay for insurance against a single loss in excess of the insurance’s actuarial 12 
 
value a function of the buyer’s taste for (or against) risk, and the variance of losses 
around the mean for buyers facing identical risks. That preference as well may be 
influenced by the buyer’s level of wealth.  It is usually specified in an empirical context 
by the coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA), which divides the coefficient of 
absolute risk aversion by wealth or income. 
  In the prospective application to data on medical spending in developing countries, 
both the form of the data and the plausibility of assumptions about buyer behavior take us 
quickly away from the stylized example of a single potential risk to lifetime wealth.  If 
capital markets were perfect, so that people could shift consumption over their lifetimes, 
then the proper measure of what is threatened by an unexpected loss would be the present 
discounted value of lifetime wealth.  Even losses that were high relative to any single 
period’s income could be quite low relative to lifetime wealth, and therefore could carry 
low risk premia.  Borrowing or saving would be a substitute for insurance.  However, in 
developing countries capital markets are surely not perfect.  What then in theory would 
be the ideal measure of what is threatened by an unexpected loss? 
  If we went to the other extreme and assumed that borrowing or saving were 
impossible over more than a brief period of time, then income in that brief period would 
be the proper measure, and it would be matched with potential losses in the same period. 
The correct model surely is something in between, probably involving current period 
income and gross or net assets.  Thus our use of a CRRA from developed country studies 
may actually understate risk aversion for these developing countries, where capital 
markets are limited.  Interfamily borrowing is a common substitute, but is surely not 
universally available or easy to arrange. 13 
 
  There are thus two influences on what time period to use for spending and income 
measures in constructing estimates of the risk premium.  One is the length of a spell of 
spending, and the other is the efficiency of the capital market.  We could simulate the 
former in our analysis, but we do not have data on the latter.  Since large medical 
expenses will almost always be associated with a potential need to borrow, the interest 
rate people in different income strata pay might be a useful indicator for future research. 
 
Conclusion:  What can we expect and what can we conclude? 
  The last piece of the puzzle is a determination of the kind of expense loadings 
insurers in developing countries might be able to achieve.  The very low (5-15%) 
loadings in private insurance in the US apply only to heavily tax-subsidized group 
insurance, and such insurance is likely to be the exception rather than the rule in 
developing countries.  A benchmark for a well managed individually purchased insurance 
in the US and other developed countries would be a loading as percentage of benefits of 
about 30%.  If developing countries could achieve this rate, our results suggest that many 
households at many income levels would find voluntary insurance attractive, compared to 
facing similar expenses out of pocket.   
  Data on administrative expenses for private insurance in developing countries is 
available, though fragmentary and not strictly comparable across countries.  One 
benchmark is private insurance in Chile, which is almost all individual (non-group) 
insurance, and which has an administrative loading of about 18% (Mahal, 2002, p. 434; 
Asociación de Isapres A.G. 1998).  However, while taking private insurance in Chile is 
voluntary, taking some insurance is mandated on the working population by imposition 14 
 
of a wage tax to fund either public or private insurance.  Private individual insurance in 
South Africa appears to be as efficiently administered as in the US (perhaps because the 
bulk of customers are higher income households employed in the formal sector of the 
economy.  The loading for the private General Insurance Company of India has been set 
at 20-32% (Mahal, 2002, p. 434).  Additional measures of this type would be useful. 
  Nevertheless, even with the knowledge we now have, it does seem possible to 
conclude that there are bright prospects for voluntary insurance in many developing 
countries.  If the insurer can segment markets by income, even low income households 
might be attracted.  If consumers or decisionmakers are wary of for-profit insurers, the 
initial source of voluntary health insurance could largely be private nonprofit firms (as it 
was in the US for decades).   
  We want to be realistic.  The argument is not that voluntary insurance is perfect—it 
will leave out the poorest households and offer limited coverage to middle income 
households—but that it is better than out of pocket payment, and is more feasible than 
heavily subsidized public insurance. 15 
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Per Capita Income, Income Growth Rates, Proportion of Medical Spending Made 
Out-of-Pocket, and Sample Sizes 

















Bangladesh   1980  5.3  64  5195 
Ecuador      3780  3.8  57  754 
Georgia 3160  7.0  80  2444 
Ghana        2340  5.2  59  2806 
India        3108  6.8  78  6282 
Kazakhstan 7680  9.1  47  4173 
Kenya 1084  3.1  45  3344 
Laos         1860  6.3  39  3666 
Pakistan 2280  5.9  65  5421 
Paraguay 4640  1.7 55  3926 
Philippines 4780  5.1  47  7491 
Senegal      1680  4.7  53  1384 
Vietnam      2670  7.4  62  2412 
              
      
 Data  Sources: 
  a: Average of 2002-2006 estimates, CIA World Factbook (2003-2007). 





Percentage of Total Out-of-Pocket Payments  
Accounted for by Lower Income Households 
Sample of Developing Countries 
 
  Spending Based Definition 
of Income 
WHO Wealth Based 
Imputed Income 









Bangladesh   63% 24% 69% 30% 
Ecuador      61%  24%  63%  28% 
Georgia  64% 21% 70% 24% 
Ghana        68%  28%  73%  35% 
India        70%  29%  77%  29% 
Kazakhstan  77% 33% 73% 35% 
Kenya  61% 17% 76% 29% 
Laos         51%  18%  69%  27% 
Pakistan  60% 21% 71% 36% 
Paraguay  70% 32% 77% 34% 
Philippines  72% 26% 72% 30% 
Senegal      45%  17%  56%  20% 
Vietnam     
 
73% 34% 79% 42% 
 







Mean Total Monthly Out-of-Pocket Spending (in PPP $) and Overall Percentage  
of Spending for Prescription Drugs 
By Country and Income Quintile (Spending-Based Definition) 
 
 
Income Quintile Group 




Country  Overall  1  2 3 4 5   
 
Bangladesh    48  24  33 40 51 92  84.1% 
Ecuador      54  31  43  39  46  108  68.7% 
Georgia  32  10  23 33 36 56  69.1% 
Ghana        49  28  36  42  58  86  48.3% 
India        50  31  40  39  66  79  54.9% 
Kazakhstan  28  20  26 27 35 32  88.8% 
Kenya 18  5  8  21  19  42  39.1% 
Laos         34  13  22  26  28  72  52.9% 
Pakistan  49  21  32 35 58 99  58.9% 
Paraguay 45  28  33  35  50  111 73.1% 
Philippines  39  21  25 38 52 67  61.4% 
Senegal      36  18  11  22  29  104  46.4% 
Vietnam  30  21  25 35 26 50  44.4% 
 
 





Reported Annual Out-of-Pocket Hospital Spending 
Mean Spending, Coefficient of Variation, and Risk Premium  
as a Percent of the Mean by Country 
 
  Overall 
 
Mean CV  Risk Premium 
as % of Mean 
 
Bangladesh   103 5.1 39% 
Ecuador   110 5.2 51% 
Georgia   62 6.1  73% 
Ghana   62 3.6  11% 
India   166 4.5 68% 
Kazakhstan   21 4.9  12% 
Kenya   34 7.8  62% 
Lao   86 5.3  101% 
Pakistan   99 4.9  50% 
Paraguay   167 5.2 42% 
Philippines   98 6.1  82% 
Senegal   44 5.1  16% 
VietNam  
 
58 6.2  60% 
 




Simulated Annual Out-of-Pocket Spending Assuming 6-Month Spell 
Mean Spending and Average Risk Premium as a Percent of the Mean by Country 
 
 
Drug Spending Only  Physician Spending Only 
Total Spending  
(Drug, Physician, and Hospital) 
  Mean 
Risk Premium 
as % of Mean  Mean 
Risk Premium 
as % of Mean  Mean 
Risk Premium as 
% of Mean 
Bangladesh   485 10%  50  5%  576  15% 
Ecuador      439 29%  88  23% 634  60% 
Georgia  269 21%  42  24% 394  62% 
Ghana        280 13% 136 16% 578  24% 
India        354 41% 123 22% 585  83% 
Kazakhstan  300 10%  12 117%  346  18% 
Kenya  90 18% 57 13%  210  57% 
Laos         220 34%  60  29% 414  78% 
Pakistan  379 20% 102  8%  606  48% 
Paraguay  391 23%  45  10% 552  57% 
Philippines  287 28%  56  25% 472  81% 
Senegal      205 16%  84  18% 413  44% 
Vietnam      164 13%  87  20% 357  78% 
 
Source: WHO World Health Survey21 
 
TABLE 5B 
Simulated Annual Out-of-Pocket Spending Assuming 3-Month Spell 
Mean Spending and Average Risk Premium as a Percent of the Mean by Country 
 
  Drug Spending Only  Physician Spending Only 
Total Spending 
(Drug, Physician, and Hospital) 
  Mean 
Risk Premium 
as % of Mean Mean 
Risk Premium 
as % of Mean Mean 
Risk Premium 
as % of Mean 
Bangladesh   487  5%  52  3%  579  8% 
Ecuador      410  14%  117  15%  580  40% 
Georgia 282  10%  46  13%  401  36% 
Ghana        278  7%  136  9%  575  12% 
India        356  22%  108  10%  597  40% 
Kazakhstan 299  5% 7  49%  337 10% 
Kenya 86  8%  56  7%  212  27% 
Laos         221  17%  60  15%  415  38% 
Pakistan 411  10%  100  4%  641  30% 
Paraguay 389  11%  47  5%  536  29% 
Philippines 292  15%  56  12%  479 42% 
Senegal      200  8%  81  10%  407  24% 
Vietnam      167  7%  84  9%  365  34% 
 
Source: WHO World Health Survey 